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Abstract:

Shadow banking in China has been viewed by government officials and industry experts as illegitimate
finance, but as a key means of financing by others. For the former, the industry has been seen as overly
risky, potentially undermining the formal financial system. The latter see shadow banking as an
increasingly important part of the financial system, filling a gap in the provision of finance to particular
sectors and smaller firms.
In this paper, we seek to understand the effect of government views on shadow banking by analyzing
the impact of government regulation on the shadow banking and non-shadow banking financial sector
(i.e., the stock market). Using a unique data set based on data collected from various sources, we find
that shadow banking regulation plays a strong role in China’s financial sector. We also discuss ways in
which China’s shadow banking sector has not gone far enough in deepening Chinese finance, and make
suggestions as to how regulators could lead the way in improving direct and market-based finance.
JEL codes: G0, O17
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Introduction
Shadow banking in China has been viewed by government officials and industry experts as illegitimate
finance, but as a key means of financing by others. For the former, the industry has been seen as overly
risky, potentially undermining the formal financial system. The latter see shadow banking as an
increasingly important part of the financial system, filling a gap in the provision of finance to particular
sectors and smaller firms.
The reason for the divergent views on shadow banking relates to its dual impact on the financial system,
particularly on commercial banks. The size of the shadow banking sector in China positively impacts the
profitability of banks, but weakens stability in the short run (Cao and Wang 2019). These different
impacts on the financial system have resulted in either opposition toward shadow banking or
opposition toward regulation. The government itself has taken both views over the development
trajectory in this industry, sometimes at the same time. Within our analytical framework, we find that
the dominant government risk outlook results in a direct impact upon shadow banking as well as in
stock market activity.
In the following article, we discuss the origins, need for, and risks of shadow banking. We then perform
a time series analysis on shadow banking and stock market statistics, looking at the impact of
government policy and media hype surrounding the sector. We and with a discussion about our unique
findings on government influence upon shadow making activities.

Origins of shadow banking
The origins of shadow banking in China are well told. We summarize the events below. Shadow banking
arose after the global financial crisis in 2008, mainly to serve the needs of local governments and
corporations that were attempting to fulfill government policy in order to stimulate the economy. As
bank finance was constrained, particularly toward riskier sectors, alternative means of financing became
prominent. In some cases, shadow banking was even endorsed by the government.
For example, Chen, He and Liu (2017) assert that the central government encouraged local governments
to borrow through local government financing vehicles. Other financial channels used included trust
loans, entrusted loans, peer-to-peer financial platforms, bankers’ acceptance notes, and wealth
management products. The government allowed these to rise without excessive regulation, as they
were necessary to bolster China's growth trajectory. At the same time, excessive risks were
condemned.
Shadow banking was accepted in the beginning. In 2012, the Governor of the PBC, Zhou Xiaochuan,
stated that ‘shadow banking is inevitable when banks are developing their business … but there are
fewer problems here than the shadow banking sector in some developed countries that have been hit
by the global financial crisis’.
Hu Xiaolian, Vice Governor People’s Bank of China, stated in September 26, 2014, “we can't just say 'no'
to shadow banks, because to some extent, they satisfy some financing demands of a diversified
economy,"
Some officials, however, voiced their concerns over shadow banking. Xiao Gang, Chairman of the Bank
of China, stated in November 2012, “because the number is so large and difficult to manage, China’s
shadow banking sector has become a potential source of systemic financial risks in the coming years”
(Zhao 2012).
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Differences in regulators' viewpoints on shadow banking were made public in 2013, as banks fought
against Regulation 9, a rule that was to be issued by the CBRC (Wei and Davis 2014). The rule limited
banks’ off-balance sheet lending activities, preventing commercial banks from using the interbank
market to make corporate loans. After a meeting between regulators and bankers in October 2013, the
CBRC altered its plans in order to accommodate bankers. Because of this, the People’s Bank of China
became concerned that the CBRC would protect the interests of banks over the rest of the financial
system and regulate too lightly. The CBRC itself believed that regulators should balance bank
profitability and stability.
In general, however, regulators understood that rules needed to be implemented in step with rising
risks. For example, in August 2010, banks were restricted in terms of bundling loans off balance sheet
through trust companies into wealth management products. Wealth management funds were restricted
in terms of how much could be invested in non-standardized debt assets as of March 2013. In December
2013, banks were required to separate wealth management product funds from their own funds. In
April 2014, trust companies were forbidden from carrying out business with shadow banking
characteristics, and interbank business was standardized. Entrusted loan rules were laid out in January
2015. Internet guidelines were implemented in July 2015. In July 2016, the market value of securities
held by wealth management products was restricted.
After the entrance of Guo Shuqing in February 2017 as head of the China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, shadow banking was more strongly constrained in order to reduce risks. Guo
had an order to audit the risky assets of China’s banks. He stated that, “rules aren’t being followed.
Those who were caught before have been repeating their offenses” (Yap 2017). From the start, Guo
uncovered violations of Chinese regulations, including those by China Minsheng Bank, which had
obtained 1.65 billion yuan ($239 million) illegally from investors for nonexistent wealth management
products.
Other officials agreed with the need to regulate shadow banking. In July 2017, Wang Zhijun, an official
with the Office of the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economic Affairs, stated that China’s
financial grey rhinos include shadow banking, property bubbles, state and local government debt, and
rampant illegal fundraising. Yi Huiman, the Chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
stated in March 2017 that “if we do not deal correctly with shadow banking, the risks could be huge”
(Bradsher 2017).
However, the conflict between government regulators and banks did not end then. As regulators
tightened their grasp on shadow banking in November 2017, opposition was laid bare after the central
bank published draft rules for new regulations on wealth management and trust products. The rules
required financial institutions to set aside 10% of management fees as risk provisions. Ten banks met in
Shanghai to complain about the new regulations. The banks noted that a sudden stop in the current
distribution of wealth management products could trigger systemic financial risks. The banks requested
a longer period of three years to adjust to the new measures. Banks felt ill prepared for the strict new
rules.
By this time, however, banks and other shadow banking institutions have little choice but to face stricter
new regulations as risk tolerance had plummeted. Peer to peer lending platforms incurred increased
scrutiny starting in mid-2017, with regulations that prohibited illegal fundraising. In July 2018, the CBIRC
announced draft measures for the of the asset management business of commercial banks, while the
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People's Bank of China announced a notice regarding the guidance of the financial asset management
business of financial institutions.
The size of trust and entrusted loans declined in 2018 due to tightened regulations. Guo's crackdown on
the shadow banking industry reduced the risk of contagion and increased the potential for financial
stability. Sheng Songcheng, Advisor to the People's Bank of China, said in August 2018: "at the beginning
of this year, regulators made it clear that they included regulation of risks associated with shadow
banking and cross-sector financial products into the priorities of this year's crackdown on the financial
market. The business of trust loans and entrusted loans has shrunk significantly since January” (Jiang
2018).
Importantly, the aim of regulation has not been to quash shadow banking altogether. As a result, some
officials have voiced their support for shadow banking as long as risks are controlled. According to Wang
Zhaoxing, vice-chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, regulators are
trying to distinguish between good and bad shadow banking in order to balance benefits and risks (Zhou
2019). Wang Zhaoxing stated further, “we need to have an accurate understanding of shadow banking.
For those [institutions] whose financing benefits the real economy and which have good internal risk
controls, we may continue to allow them to exist and support them,” in his view, one of the main risks is
that shadow banking funds will enter the real estate market. Xiang Songzuo, former deputy director at
the People's Bank of China, stated in March 2019 that "I think this year, regulators will encourage more
shadow banking financing, particularly to the private sector." Finally, Yi Gang, governor of the central
bank, has stated that shadow banking is not a completely negative word.
These recent statements mark a break from the division in views from the past. At present, there
appears to be a compromise about the shadow banking industry, which aims to make use of the
additional financing channel without sacrificing overall financial stability. We explore the extent to which
this view is realistic below.
The figures below show the rise and fall of shadow banking, first as a percentage of RMB bank loans, and
second in terms of trust and entrusted loans for the period of 2012 through fall 2019. One can see the
impact of regulations on the shadow banking sector taking effect in 2017 through 2019, particularly in
the second figure.
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A necessary evil?
Now that we have discussed the origins of shadow banking, we ask, is shadow banking a necessary evil?
To understand this, we should point out some aspects of the industry that are stated in the literature
and some that have not been highlighted.
First, as is known, shadow banking in China can only be understood in the context of the banking
industry. As shadow banks cannot accept depository funds, they are closely tied to the banking system.
Banks are closely regulated, and the larger state-owned banks are often relied upon to carry out
government policy. Initially, shadow banks took on the role of channeling funds to the riskier sectors
that banks were not permitted to lend to. They also provided an alternative channel of investment for
retail investors who had few profitable options outside of the stock market.
Second, the financial system’s lack of well-developed corporate bond, stock, and other asset markets
has resulted in a lack of liquidity and profitability in Chinese investments. Shadow banking provided
alternative forms of investment, especially when underlying assets, such as junk bonds, risky loans,
stocks, and a panoply of higher yield investments were bundled together. The rise of trust and entrusted
loans, bankers’ acceptance notes, and P2P lending platforms imitated a better developed financial
market that offers a variety of instruments with different risk levels. The effect was the same: funds
could be made available to riskier borrowers, and buyers could purchase the instruments as
investments.
However, there were a couple of major differences between the non-bank financial markets in China
versus in the West. One of these is that many of those holding the risky investments were retail, rather
than institutional investors, such as pension funds or life insurance companies. Another difference is
that the underlying Chinese assets often were associated with fewer covenants that restricted debtor
activities, such as taking out a number of additional loans even as repayment capacity declined.
The implications of the first are that investors, mainly individuals, did not understand risks. It didn’t help
that many times, products sold to these individuals lacked transparency about the underlying assets.
Because investors did not understand the risks of their investments, and would protest when and if they
failed, causing social instability, the government frequently stepped in to cover the losses. This meant
that there were really two investors-households, which enjoyed the upside of shadow banking products,
and the government (often local governments) which absorbed the downside of shadow banking
products. This resulted in excessive investment in risky products due to investors’ intentional or
unintentional awareness of moral hazard.
The second difference regarding lack of restrictions on debtor activities resulted in overleveraging of
borrowers. This led to the excessive buildup of debt throughout China’s economy. For state-owned
companies, the issue of moral hazard arose again, since financial firms were amenable to lending to
institutions protected by the state. The state would likely assist state-owned enterprises in trouble.
Despite these differences with the West, shadow banking played a couple of roles that were
conspicuously absent in China, and badly needed: lender to riskier entities, and provider of higher yields
to investors. Some of the riskier borrowing entities were state-related firms building up infrastructure
under the post-stimulus policy directive, while others, particularly private small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs), have provided and continue to provide the bulk of GDP production. This bifurcation
in types of borrowers is particular to the Chinese economy, which has promoted the state sector to
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carry out policies, and has permitted the growth of the private sector, in the form of private, often
family-run SMEs that are not encouraged to grow too large.
Shadow banking’s promise of higher returns was attractive to households with increasingly higher
incomes. This is because China’s banking system, the main source of finance, has not been able to
provide significant returns on deposits. Even after deposit interest rates were liberalized, they remained
close to official benchmark rates set by the central bank. Other investments, such as stocks and bonds,
were not well developed and often incurred high risks. Wealth management products promised far
higher returns than bank deposits and appeared to enjoy implicit repayment guarantees.
Shadow banking thus burst out of China’s financially repressive system in several permutations. There
were shadow banking institutions with high barriers to entry, such as trust companies and, indeed,
banks, and those with low barriers to entry, such as P2P lending companies. Despite the variety of
shadow banking institutions that arose, many products were loan-centric and did not incorporate direct
financing methods that might have better aligned investors and borrower incentives. Trust loans,
entrusted loans, even peer to peer loans dominated the industry and comprised the basis of
securitization. The need for short-term loan repayments frequently led to Ponzi-like financing to repay
investors when loans wobbled. Because of this, the structure of these alternative financial channels was
not a strong complement to bank loans, and was possibly even a poor substitute.
It can therefore be said that China’s shadow banking system did not go far enough in diversifying its
financial system. Certainly, some borrowers who could not receive funds from banks were able to obtain
loans from the shadow banking sector, but the new types of finance did not increase the sophistication
or the depth of China's financial landscape.
The shadow banking system was successful in reassigning the uses of bank finance but not in creating
new, sustainable sources of finance. For example, funds raised by banks for wealth management
products often came from bank customers looking to obtain a higher yield for their savings. Retail
customers may shift funds from deposits to wealth management products. The same can be said for
entrusted loans; company funds that might have been used as deposits are lent, through banks, to
another firm. In both cases, the shadow banking system reassigns potential loanable funds from banks
to riskier borrowers, taking advantage of high savings rate on the part of firms and households.
Figure 3. China’s bank-centric shadow banking system

Source: Author’s own
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In addition, shadow banking was not always efficient, as it often diverted funds to less productive
sectors. While it makes sense to have alternative lenders who have the capacity to lend to riskier
borrowers, it cannot be justified if those higher risks are not balanced with higher returns stemming
from real productivity rather than Ponzi finance. A large percentage of the funds were lent for the
construction of infrastructure and real estate in places that were not seeing returns. It was unclear
whether some of these projects would ever enjoy returns, or whether they would simply add to China's
mountain of bad debt.
Things might have been different. New sources of finance might have included private equity (including
venture capital) or well-priced corporate debt. These areas of finance are far less developed in China
than in developed nations. Private equity and corporate debt may both allow for longer payment
periods than loans and would have injected more stability into China’s capital markets than wealth
management products.
Hence, in our opinion, Chinese shadow banking in its current form is a poor cousin to the financial
deepening and development that is part of Western financial systems. Although the industry provides
some much-needed benefits to firms, financial institutions, and investors, the way in which it has
developed threatens financial stability without providing sufficient added value. It is in desperate need
of being restructured and would benefit from regulator involvement from the outset to shape the
permitted financial activity.
Risks of shadow banking
China’s shadow banking sector has frequently been in the news for its associated risks. While we do not
attempt to enumerate the extensive list of risks here, we describe several major types of risks that arose
in the past ten years.
One major risk was created by the use of implicit guarantees in the sales of wealth management
products. Indeed, Dang, Wang, and Yao (2014) show that Chinese shadow banking is built on implicit
guarantees, and operates mainly through banks, rather than through capital markets as in the US.
Implicit guarantees lead to moral hazard, as financial institutions participate freely in shadow banking
activities, such as issuance of wealth management products, because they themselves (not only the
retail customers) believe they will be bailed out by the government if the products collapse.
Another major risk was created by the existence off-balance sheet transactions. Between 2010 and
2015, wealth management business, entrusted loan business, and undiscounted bill business were dealt
with to a large extent off banks’ balance sheets. Risks were compounded when assets were overpriced.
Dangers arose as wealth management products incorporated nonperforming loans, or later, trust
beneficiary rights or directional asset management plans which could include overvalued nonperforming
loans. Other overpriced assets included corporate bonds, which faced an asset price bubble in 2016.
Corporate bonds were mispriced, since default risks were not properly priced in. In addition, many
corporate bonds were issued by local government financing vehicles, and were in danger of potential
default. In April 2016, the corporate bond market was upset when several state owned enterprises
defaulted on corporate bonds, leading to a large corporate bond selloff and cancellation of bond sales.
Maturity mismatches created the need to issue ever-more wealth management products. Short
maturities reflected the desire by households for short-term returns, but did not meet the funding
needs of issuers. Luo et al (2019) have suggested that such mismatches were created so that banks
could disguise non-performing loans by recapitalizing their balance sheets before the end of each
8

quarter. While in developed countries, asset maturity periods were originally aligned with liquidity
requirements by financial institutions, in China this was not the case. Loans bundled among other
underlying assets in a wealth management product often had longer maturities. Some of the projects
associated with such loans had even longer horizons until profitability could be reached, as they were
anchored in the infrastructure or real estate sectors where demand was slack. This meant that loans
were often taken out to repay existing loans.
Due to maturity mismatches in particular, banks often turned to interbank borrowing in order to fund
shadow banking activities. Certificates of deposit grew as a percentage of interbank liabilities, with jointstock and city commercial banks issuing most of them, since most retail deposits are concentrated at the
largest five state-owned banks. From the beginning of the CD market in 2014, the volume of outstanding
CDs increased to 8 trillion RMB at the end of the first quarter of 2017 (Chui and Upper 2017). The central
bank imposed a cap on CDs starting in 2018, which dampened this phenomenon.
Systemic risk rose until Guo’s crackdown on shadow banking, as wealth management products became
increasingly interconnected through banks and trusts. What is more, a lack of transparency in shadow
banking transactions, particularly in the area of entrusted loans, created the potential of transmitting
financial fragility between and within industries.
Chinese banks had also engaged in taking structured deposits, which amounted to 10.8 trillion yuan
($1.5 trillion) as of September 2019. The yields on these deposits are linked to prices of other assets.
Smaller banks in particular used the structured deposits in order to attract funds. These accounted for
8.2% of deposits at such small and medium sized banks.
Transmission of dominant risk sentiment
The Chinese government has significant power in controlling shadow banking activity by making known
its risk sentiment; that is, whether government risk fears are high or low, whether the government
wishes to allow shadow banking to run its course or not, is rapidly transmitted to the shadow banking
industry as well as to the financial industry overall.
There are two major mechanisms in which this works. The first is through the media. State media sets
the tone for risk aversion by discussing shadow banking risks, which the public reads and acts upon.
The second mechanism is through policy curbing shadow banking activities. This has an immediate
effect on the shadow banking industry. Government policy may be a direct command given to
institutions, but this is most commonly reserved for banks. For example, in February 2019, a Circular
issued by the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council required banks to lend to
private firms (Tang 2019). For other institutions, failure to comply with regulations can mean dissolution
or severe punishment. In Hunan province in October 2019, P2P lenders were entirely banned due to
their failure to comply with new regulations (Liu 2019).
One major reason that the government risk sentiment is transmitted so effectively, as we will see in our
empirical analysis, is because the state has the ultimate power in the financial sector to either quash or
encourage activity. All institutions are ultimately subordinate to governmental power. However, it is not
that institutions and households react solely to government media statements or policies directly (such
as, “the government will curb entrusted loans, so our institution will not invest in entrusted loans) but
also that these entities react to government actions as an overall policy toward shadow banking (“the
government is cracking down on shadow banking, so we must avoid it.”)
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Very little has been written on this topic. There are papers which discuss the impact of monetary policy
on the shadow banking sector, but not on government regulation. Within the monetary policy/shadow
banking literature, one finding shows that contractionary monetary policy brought about shadow
banking after the global crisis (Chen, Ren and Zha 2016).
Model and data
We test whether government opinion on shadow banking risks impacts holdings of entrusted loans to
find out whether changing government opinions impact investors’ actions. As a proxy for government
opinion on shadow banking risks, we use the incidence of the phrase “shadow banking risks” in Chinese
in the People’s Daily, considered the mouthpiece of the Communist party. Data is from January 1, 2012
through December 31, 2018. We test whether government regulation on shadow banking impacts
holdings of entrusted loans for the January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2018 period. We hypothesize that
regulations WILL reduce holdings of entrusted loans as investors view some shadow banking channels as
being shut down by the government. Furthermore, entrusted loans have usually been made between
state-owned enterprises, which are normally held responsible for carrying out government policy,
although dynamics between central-local regulation and SOEs may add another layer of complexity that
we do not discuss here.
We also test whether government regulation and media mention of shadow banking risks will dampen
stock market activity. We hypothesize that these factors will not dampen stock market activity due to
the mainly retail makeup of stock market clientele and their belief that investors are given implicit
guarantees by the government.
To begin with, we test for stationarity in both models using the Dickey Fuller test for unit root. We find
that both models are stationary, with results as follows:
Variable

T-statistic

Lags used
0

Observations Critical
value (1%)
82
-3.535

Critical
value (5%)
-2.904

Critical
value (10%)
-2.587

Entrusted
loan first
difference
Shanghai
Composite
second
difference

-14.329

-85.059

0

2554

-2.860

-2.570

-3.430

Then we turn to the first test, of government regulation and mention in the media of shadow banking
risks on entrusted loan activity.
Our first model is a moving average model of first order, MA(1).
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜃1 𝜀𝑡−1 , where -1 < θ1 < 1.
Where μ is the mean of the series, εt is white noise, θ is a parameter.
In our equation, y represents the first differenced entrusted loans.
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Independent variables indicate whether a shadow banking regulation was made and how many times
the People’s Daily discussed shadow banking risks.
The model used is a moving average model of first order, or MA(1).
We use monthly data for the period 2012-2018.
Coefficient
Standard Error
Constant
60.48
67.49
SB Rule made
-222.47
100.07
PD SB risks
5.22
10.1
ARMA MA(1)
-0.74
0.07

Z
0.90
-2.22
0.52
-10.79

P>|z|
0.370
0.026
0.605
0.00

The results show that shadow banking regulations have a large, negative impact on entrusted loan
activity, which is what was expected. Mention of shadow banking risks in the media do not have a
significant impact on entrusted loan activity.
We then turn to the impact of shadow banking regulations and media mention of shadow banking risks
on the Shanghai Composite, controlling for monetary policy by using the second differenced daily level
of open market operations.
The model is as follows:
The second model is a moving average model of twelfth order, MA(12). Data used is daily data, with the
second difference of the Shanghai Composite closing value as the dependent variable, and daily
mentions of shadow banking in the People’s Daily, second difference of open market operations, and
indicator of whether shadow banking regulations were implemented as independent variables.
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜃1 𝜀𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜃12 𝜀𝑡−12

SB Rule made
Open market
operations
PD SB risks
ARMA MA(12)

Coefficient
-11.78
.00

Standard Error
5.82
.012

Z
-2.02
0.07

P>|z|
0.04
0.94

2.51
0.03

3.63
0.12

0.69
2.18

0.49
0.03

According to the results, shadow banking regulations have a significantly negative on the stock
market. This is contrary to what we hypothesized, which is that regulations would not have a
significant effect on the stock market due to investors’ belief in implicit guarantees. However, it
is an interesting result because it shows that the stock market is sensitive to an environment of
increasing perceived risks and associated government tightening.
Both models reveal that both the shadow banking sector as well as the stock market are impacted
by tightening government regulation on shadow banking. This reveals the importance of the
shadow banking sector in China’s overall financial system.
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Discussion
It is interesting that government policy tends to curb both stock market and entrusted loan activity,
despite the fact that the shadow banking system of entrusted loans is mainly a bank-based system,
whereas the stock market system is a direct financing system. While these systems are not altogether
separate, they are not immediately tied together. Ehlers, Kong and Zhu (2018) demonstrate this aspect
in their shadow banking map, which does not explicitly include the stock market. Even though stocks
may be incorporated into asset management products, the stock market is not well integrated into the
shadow banking sector per se. Certainly, both sectors are affected by similar factors, such as interest
rates, external shocks such as the US-China trade war, economic growth, and monetary policy, but it is
an aspect of China’s lack of financial deepening in non-bank related finance that the two areas continue
to face segregation.
As a result of our analysis, it appears that government regulation on shadow banking affects both the
shadow banking industry and the stock market. Talk of “shadow banking risks” in the People’s Daily does
not seem to play an important role in the real activity of these industries. From this, we can gather that,
while officials may support or oppose shadow banking, as noted above, it is regulation itself that
investors pay attention to.
We have also noted above that shadow banking is not, in our view, a necessary evil. The Chinese
financial system is deeply flawed, and shadow banking has failed to fix these flaws. If investors pay
attention to regulations, regulators should attempt to encourage direct and market-based finance that
will improve the efficiency and reach of the financial sector. Even though officials have given lip service
to promoting direct finance, the corporate bond sector, stock market, and private equity sector remain
underdeveloped and insufficiently market-based.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the shadow banking literature by analyzing the impact of government
regulation on the shadow banking and non-shadow banking financial sector (i.e., the stock market).
Using a unique data set based on data collected from various sources, we find that shadow banking
regulation plays a strong role in China’s financial sector. We also discuss ways in which China’s shadow
banking sector has not gone far enough in deepening Chinese finance, and make suggestions as to how
regulators could lead the way in improving direct and market-based finance.

12

References:
1. Bradsher, Keith. 2017. Shadow Lending Threatens China’s Economy, Officials Warn. March 18,
New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/business/china-economy-debtshadow-banking.html.
2. Cao, Yiran and Dong Wang. 2019. The Effects of Shadow Banking on Stability and Profitability of
China’s Commercial Banks: Evidence from Panel VAR. General and Social Science: Current
Trends, 2019:1:1:3, 1-12.
3. Chen, Kaiji, Jue Ren, and Tao Zha. 2016. What We Learn from China’s Rising Shadow Banking:
Exploring the Nexus of Monetary Tightening and Banks’ Role in Entrusted Lending. NBER
Working Paper 21890 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21890.
4. Chen, Zhuo, Zhiguo He and Chun Liu. 2018. The Financing of Local Government in China:
Stimulus Loan Wanes and Shadow Banking Waxes. Working paper,
http://www.zhiguohe.com/uploads/1/0/6/9/106923057/p7_zc_draft_20170825.pdf.
5. Chui, Michael and Christian Upper. 2017. Recent developments in Chinese shadow banking.
SUERF Policy Note 20, November,
https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_673271cc47c1a4e77f57e239ed4d28a7_1697_suerf.pdf.
6. Dang, Tri Vi and Honglin Wang and Aidan Yao. September 2014. Chinese Shadow Banking: BankCentric Misperceptions, http://www.hkimr.org/uploads/publication/394/wp-no-22_2014-final.pdf
7. Ehlers, Torsten, Steven Kong and Feng Zhu. 2018. Mapping shadow banking in China:
structure and dynamics. BIS Working Papers No 701,
8. Jiang Xueqing, 2018, Rules rein in shadow banking, China Daily, August 7,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/07/WS5b68fe6da3100d951b8c8fcf.html
9. Liu, Yujing. 2019. China’s Hunan province imposes total ban on P2P lenders after operators fail
to comply with regulations. SCMP, October 17, https://amp.scmp.com/business/chinabusiness/article/3033378/chinas-hunan-province-imposes-total-ban-p2p-lenders-after
10. National Bureau of Statistics. 2019. Monthly Indicators,
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01.
11. Nnews.edu. 2019. Decision Making Difference Threaten to Kill Economic Recovery. Nnews
Finance, March 1, https://www.nnews.eu/finance/5947.html.
12. People’s Bank of China. 2019. Statistics. Pbc.gov.cn
13. Tang, Frank. 2019. China’s government tells banks to ‘increase financial support’ for private
firms to aid slowing economy. SCMP, February 15, https://www.scmp.com/economy/chinaeconomy/article/2186309/chinas-government-tells-banks-increase-financial-support/
14. Wei, Lingling and Bob Davis. 2014. Regulators at Odds on Reining In China's Shadow Lending,
Wall Street Journal, January 14.
15. Yap, Chuin-Wei. 2017. Chinese Banks Rattled by Regulatory Blitz. Wall Street Journal, May 14,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-banks-rattled-by-regulatory-blitz-1494766803.
16. Zhao Pengfei. 2012. “Hot spotlight: China's "shadow bank" will not risk losing control”, People’s
Daily, November 21, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1121/c49155-19650540.html
17. Zhou, Cissy. 2019. China to ‘strike a balance’ between good and bad shadow bankers to halt fall
in growth. South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-

13

economy/article/2189394/china-mulls-reprieve-some-shadow-bankers-stop-fall-growth,
10 Mar.

14

Appendix I. Shadow banking regulations, 2012-2018

Name of regulation

Issue
date

Content

Guidance on strengthening the risk 2012-2- strict control of new financing platform loans.
supervision of local government
21
financing platform loans in 2012
Notice of the China Banking
2013-3- The balance of wealth management funds invested in nonRegulatory Commission on Relevant 25
standardized debt assets is at the upper limit of 35%.
Issues Concerning the Regulation of
the Investment Operation of
Commercial Banks' Wealth
Management Business
Central Bank internal meeting 2013-4- Introduce new management rules for the holding
Discussion on the regulation and
24
transaction, and gradually cancel or upgrade the C-class
development of inter-bank bond
account
market
Announcement on Further Regulating 2013-5- It is forbidden for the same financial institution legal person
the Management of Related
14
to conduct related transactions in the interbank market
Transactions
among all its bond accounts.
People's Bank of China
2013-7- All bond transactions in the inter-bank market were reached
Announcement [2013] No. 8
2
through the National Interbank Funding Center System.
General Office of the State Council 2013- classifies China’s shadow banking activities into three
issued the "Notice on Some Issues of 12-31 categories: credit intermediaries without a financial license
Strengthening the Regulation of
which are totally unregulated; credit intermediaries without
Shadow Banks" (Doc 107)
a financial license which are under inadequate regulation;
and credit intermediaries with a financial license which have
inadequately regulated or unregulated businesses
Measures for the Management of
2014-1- The liquidity coverage of commercial banks should reach
Liquidity Risks of Commercial Banks 17
100% by the end of 2018.
(Trial)
Guidance on risk supervision of trust 2014-4- Trust companies may not carry out business with shadow
companies
8
banking characteristics such as non-standardized wealth
management funds pool
Notice on Regulating the Inter-bank 2014-4- Define and standardize interbank borrowing, interbank
Business of Financial Institutions
24
deposits, interbank borrowing, interbank payment,
Notice of the General Office of the
2014-5- Other departments and branches other than the franchise
China Banking Regulatory
8
department of commercial banks shall not engage in interCommission on Regulating the
bank business.
Management of Interbank Business
of Commercial Banks (Doc 127, 140)
CSRC: Securities company and fund 2014- Regulates and clarifies responsibilities of institutions doing
management company subsidiaries 11-19 asset securitization business
asset securitization business
management regulations
15

CBRC Draft Rules on Entrusted Loans 2015-1- States that five categories of funds must not be used for
16
entrusted loans, mainly banks lending to companies and
funds raised from other investors
PBC Notice 7 Simplify management of 2015-4- Describes requirements for credit asset securities and
credit asset securities issuance
14
management
China Banking Regulatory
2015-6- Regulates licensing of financial asset management
Commission, non-bank financial
5
companies, enterprise group finance companies, financial
institution: Administrative licensing
leasing companies, auto finance companies, currency
matters
brokerage companies, consumer finance companies, and
overseas non-bank financial institutions
China Banking Regulatory
2015-6- Describes regulations for establishment, change, and
Commission Trust Company
5
termination of trust company
Administrative licensing matters
China Banking Regulatory
2015-7- Administrative penalties are laid out for banks, trusts, and
Commission Administrative Penalty 9
other financial institutions.
Measures
Guiding Opinions on Promoting the 2015-7- Encourages innovation while controlling for risks in internet
Healthy Development of Internet
18
finance.
Finance
Notice on matters relating to the
2016-6- Key inspections on the channel business of insurance asset
cleanup of the insurance asset
1
management companies.
management company's channel
business
Notice on Strengthening the
2016-6- It is forbidden to issue products of the "fund pool" nature, it
Supervision of Portfolio Insurance
13
is forbidden to issue classified products to non-institutional
Asset Management Products Business
investors, and it is forbidden to issue equity-type and hybrid
classified products to institutional investors more than 1
times leverage.
Interim Provisions on the Operation 2016-7- The leverage ratio of stocks and mixed assets management
Management of Private Equity Asset 14
shall not exceed 1 time at most, and the leverage of futures,
Management Business of Securities
fixed income and non-standard asset management plans
and Futures Operating Agencies
shall not exceed 3 times.
Banking Financial Management
2016-7- The market value of all securities issued by one wealth
Supervision and Management
27
management product held by one institution shall not
Measures
exceed 10% of the balance of the wealth management
products.
China Banking Regulatory
2016-8- China imposed limits on lending by peer-to-peer platforms to
Commission (CBRC), Ministry of
24
individuals and companies.
Public Security, Cyberspace
Administration of China and the
Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology P2P Regulation
Bank off-balance sheet financing will 2016- The central bank will adjust the scope of the “macrobe included in the MPA generalized 10-27 prudential assessment system” to include bank wealth
credit monitoring scope
management in the broad credit range of the MPA system.

16

Notice on Further Strengthening the
Relevant Matters Concerning the
Supervision of Investment in
Insurance Funds
Notice on the special governance of
the illegal behaviors of the banking
industry

2017-1- Targeting the stock investment behavior of insurance group
24
(holding) companies, insurance companies and insurance
asset management companies

2017-3- Strengthen the compliance management of the banking
28
industry, check the bank's compliance with existing laws,
regulations and rules, and conduct special treatment on
“violation of financial laws, violation of regulatory rules,
violation of internal regulations”.
Banking financial institutions
2017-3- For the current cross-market and cross-industry crossregulatory arbitrage special
28
financial financial services such as interbank business,
governance work points
investment business, and wealth management business of
various banking financial institutions, special governance is
carried out on issues such as high leverage and arbitrage.
Notice on the implementation of the 2017-4- Whether wealth management products directly invest in
special governance work of the
6
credit assets, whether to assist banks in circumventing
bank's "inappropriate innovation,
regulatory requirements by arranging explicit or implicit
improper transactions, improper
repurchase clauses in the cooperation
incentives, improper charges"
Notice on Focusing on the
2017-4- Banking financial institutions and supervisory departments
Reorganization of the Banking Market 7
at all levels are required to conduct comprehensive selfexamination.
Guidance on the risk prevention and 2017-4- Require the banking industry to effectively resolve
control of the banking industry
7
outstanding risks and strictly adhere to the bottom line of
systemic risks
Notice on effectively making up for 2017-4- follow-up supervision and risk containment.
the short-term supervision and
10
improvement of supervision
effectiveness
Notice on Further Regulating Local 2017-4- The focus is on organizing the clean-up and rectification of
Government's Debt Financing
26
local government financing guarantees, effectively
Behavior
strengthening the financing management of financing
platform companies, standardizing the cooperative behavior
of government and social capital parties, further improving
the standardized local government debt financing
mechanism, establishing cross-sector joint monitoring and
prevention and control mechanisms, and vigorously
promoting six aspects of information disclosure
CBIRC Notice 6 2017, Guiding
Opinions of the China Banking
Reduce bank risks, including of wealth management
Regulatory Commission on Banking 2017-4- products
Risk Prevention and Control
10
Office of the Leading Group for the
Special Remediation of Internet
required provincial groups to submit summary reports by the
Financial Risks Circular 64, Notice on
end of the month on violation of laws
the Cleanup and Rectification of the 2017-6Cooperation between Internet
30
17

Platforms and Various Trading Places
in Violation of Laws
Office of the Leading Group for the
Special Remediation of Internet
Financial Risks, Circular on Regulating
"Cash Loans" Business
P2P Network Loan Risk Special
Remediation Leading Group Office,
Document 57, Notice on Doing a
Good Job in P2P Network Lending
Risk Special Rectification and
Reconstruction and Acceptance
CBIRC Administrative Measures for
Commercial Bank Entrusted Loans
CBIRC Notice on Further Deepening
the Reconciliation of the Banking
Market
PBOC, CBIRC, SAFE, CSRC, Guiding
opinion on regulating the asset
management business of financial
institutions

201712-1

Prohibited illegal fundraising

Regulators required local governments to improve the P2P
industry in their areas, registering major online lending
platforms

201712-8
2018-1Regulate source and use of entrusted loans
5

2018-1- Reduce risks of banking, including shadow banking aspects
13

Regulate asset management products, no explicit or implicit
2018-4- guarantee, simplify products
27
strengthen the supervision and management of the wealth
CBIRC Order No. 6 2018 Commercial
management business of commercial banks, promote the
Bank Financial Management
healthy development of commercial banks' wealth
Supervision and Management
2018-9- management business, and protect the legitimate rights and
Measures
26
interests of investors
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